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PROTECTED EXPRESSION:
TOWARD A SPEAKER-ORIENTED THEORY
ELIOT F. KRIEGER*
INTRODUCTION
This article argues for a very simple point: When analyzing what consti-
tutes protected expression, the only approach that is philosophically coherent is
one that looks to the speaker, not the listener. Although this may seem too
obvious to be disputed, many theorists and many Supreme Court opinions, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, assume that in determining the criteria for protect-
ed expression the speaker's perspective is irrelevant and the listener's perspec-
tive is pivotal. I will use a Wittgensteinian analysis to show the incoherence of
a listener-focused theory for the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech
Clause.'
This listener-focused category of theory often hinges on what has been
termed the expression/conduct distinction.2 Although legal theorists have criti-
* Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of California. Former law clerk to the Honor-
able Stephen S. Trott, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; B.A., U.C.L.A., 1981; M.A.,
Ph.D. (Philosophy), Johns Hopkins University, 1986, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1991.
1. By "Wittgensteinian analysis," I mean that my critique of listener-focused theories relies
on the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, although he
spent most of the last 22 years of his life at Cambridge University in England. The primary con-
cern in his works is the nature of language and meaning. His two major works are Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (completed in 1918) and Philosophical Investigations (published after his
death, Part I written between 1936-1945 and Part II written between 1947-1949). To a large ex-
tent, the Philosophical Investigations was an attack on Wittgenstein's own earlier theory set out in
the Tractatus. This article will only concern itself with the later Wittgenstein of Philosophical
Investigations. LUDWIG WITFGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968).
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects grand metaphysical theory-making. He
holds that philosophy cannot uncover Platonic truths (which he considers nonsense). Much of
Wittgenstein's work in Philosophical Investigations is a critique of the typical fallacies found in
theories about meaning and language. Among Wittgenstein's targets are those theories of meaning
that propose a private inner object in the mind, a popular concept for many philosophers.
The private inner object derives from the Cartesian impulse to separate the mind from the
body. It is called private because it can only be understood from the first-person perspective.
Some examples Wittgenstein discusses are mental images, pain, various emotional states, and
linguistic meaning.
In my discussion, infra, I show that courts and theorists who try to define protected ex-
pression often make fallacious assumptions positing private inner objects.
2. "Expression" is just that, protected expression. By "conduct," those who use the distinc-
tion refer to actions that are not expression, and are therefore outside the realm of protected
speech. For example, as I will discuss infra, Frederick Schauer argues that literature is protected
expression, but obscenity is not protected because it is closer to conduct than expression-there is
no attempt to communicate and create a "cognitive content in the listener." Instead, Schauer says
obscenity is more like physical conduct, its only point is to affect the audience physically. See
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cized simple versions of this distinction in the past,3 more sophisticated ver-
sions continue to be popular among scholars and in Supreme Court opinions.4
I will show that any such distinction, whether simple or ornately complex, is
in fact philosophical nonsense.
But exposing this distinction's incoherence leads to a serious dilemma: if
we abandon the expression/conduct distinction, we may also sacrifice a "re-
flective equilibrium"5 with our pre-theoretical thoughts on how to distinguish
protected from unprotected speech. I will argue, however, that moving the
emphasis from the listener to the speaker in First Amendment jurisprudence
results in a broader definition of "expression," thereby allowing other princi-
ples to limit the category of protected expression. In the last two sections of
this article, I will show how this theory ultimately yields a Kantian justifica-
tion as opposed to a utilitarian justification for protecting individuals' freedom
of conscience.
Jurists often invoke the expression/conduct distinction in obscenity and
nude dancing cases.6 Anti-pornography advocates also attempt to justify prohi-
discussion infra part I.
3. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 825-32 (2d
ed. 1988); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21
UCLA. L. REV. 29, 38-57 (1973).
4. 1 will skip any exegesis on Supreme Court jurisprudence except to say that the Court, as
recently as 1991, utilized the expression/conduct distinction. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560 (1991) (addressing the issue of whether nude dancing deserved First Amendment protec-
tion); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (utilizing an "expression-action" dis-
tinction in ruling on the constitutionality of a Texas flag-burning statute).
In Barnes, Justice Scalia used the conduct/expression distinction to remove nude dancing
from the area of protected activity by declaring that the State was regulating conduct, not expres-
sion. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring). Even though Scalia was the only Justice to
explicitly apply the expression/conduct distinction, in fact, both Scalia and the plurality opinion
made similar assumptions. Instead of a straightforward conduct/expression distinction, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, made a conduct/message distinction. He assumed that the
conduct of the dance was distinguishable from the message of the dance. Nudity can be banned,
but expression is protected. See id. at 570-71. Although one may doubt the intellectual honesty of
this opinion, an underlying assumption in the decision is the separation of conduct and mes-
sage-or of conduct and expression. Though separate from Justice Scalia's expression/conduct dis-
tinction, it derives from the same dualistic metaphysical assumptions.
Some commentators have argued that to call nude dancing non-expressive is simply a fac-
tual error. See, e.g., Zachary T. Fardon, Recent Developments, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.: Nude
Dancing and the First Amendment Question, 45 VAND. L. REV. 237, 265-68 (1992). I will attack
these theories by arguing that to separate conduct and expression is to rely on an incoherent phi-
losophy of mind.
5. This term was first used by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51
(1971). A good definition appears in a later work:
Reflective equilibrium is a test that measures how well the view as a whole meshes with
and articulates our more firm considered convictions, at all levels of generality, after due
examination, once all adjustments and revisions that seem compelling have been made.
A doctrine that meets this criterion is the doctrine that, so far as we can now ascertain,
is the most reasonable for us.
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 534 (1980).
6. I am not concerned with those theorists who justify the prohibition of pornography on
moral grounds. For example, one theory justifying censorship "relies on an analysis of the histori-
cal and structural roots of the first amendment, and finds that the amendment was never intended
to protect nonpolitical expression of any sort.... [This] theory fully and explicitly embraces the
morality principle ...." Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Por-
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bition of pornography on the grounds that it constitutes non-speech and there-
fore should not be protected speech.' The way "conduct" is defined as op-
posed to "expression" reveals the theory's implicit focus on the message
receiver's cognitive stimulation, as opposed to mere physical stimulation (in
conduct). I will show that this distinction assumes an incoherent philosophy of
mind.
I. METAPHYSICAL DUALISM IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
First Amendment jurisprudence has been dogged since its inception by a
definitional difficulty. The Constitution states, "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech," but what constitutes "speech?"' In
defining speech, the two possible focal points are the speaker and the audi-
ence. Some case law seems to focus on one, some on the other.9 I will argue
nography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1581 (1988). Interestingly, Robert Bork, an
adherent to this view, has stated that "constitutionally, art and pornography are on a par with
industry and smoke pollution." Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1971); see also Miller v. Civil City, 904 F.2d 1081, 1126 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (stating that "[b]arroom displays are to ballet as white noise is
to music"), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). Both Easterbrook
and Bork reveal through their statements that, at bottom, they view such expression as basically
worthless, and therefore not worthy of protection.
7. There is a large amount of literature on this topic, and many distinguished scholars have
supported the expression/conduct distinction. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); John M. Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic
of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1968); Frederick Schauer, Speech and
"Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Lan-
guage, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979) [hereinafter Speech and Obscenity]; Cass R. Sunstein, Pornogra-
phy and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589. While Sunstein argues that the expres-
sion/conduct distinction should be used to justify the prohibition of pornography, Schauer claims
that the distinction, in fact, underlies the Supreme Court's decisions on obscenity. Id. at 627 n.88
(citing Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra, at 932).
As noted above, the Supreme Court has adopted some of this methodology. See Paris Adult
Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973).
This article will not deal specifically with what constitutes obscenity. I will only be concerned
with arguments that claim obscenity is (or, for that matter, that pornography should be) outside the
realm of protected expression because it constitutes conduct rather than expression.
8. It has long been established, however, that "speech" includes non-verbal expression. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (declaring invalid statutes prohibiting display
of any flag, badge, banner, or device "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized
government").
9. One can find both in Supreme Court cases. In First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978), for example, Justice White argued that the goal of the First Amendment is "self-realiza-
tion" and "communications emanating from individuals." Id. at 804 (White, J., dissenting). How-
ever, in Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976), the Court held that society has a strong interest in the free flow of information, and that
the goal of the First Amendment is to enlighten public decision-making. Id. at 757; see also Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (stating that the First Amendment creates reliable decision-
making).
Some cases acknowledge the importance of both perspectives. See, e.g., Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the defendant's conduct, wearing a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the draft," was protected by the First Amendment). In Cohen, the Court noted that one of
the goals of the First Amendment is "to produce a more capable citizenry." Id. at 24. This criteri-
on refers to the listeners of the communication. However, the Court also stated that the freedom
must "comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests." Id. The second criterion focuses on the individual dignity given to the speakers of the com-
munication. See discussion, infra part VI.
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that there is a methodology at work here: those decisions that rely on the
expression/conduct distinction implicitly focus on the listener to determine
when an expression fails to comprise an "essential part of any exposition of
ideas."
This assumption is evident in the writings of Frederick Schauer.
Espousing a listener-focused theory, Schauer believes that "what the Court
really had in mind, or should have had in mind, [in its obscenity cases] is the
communication of a mental stimulus, an attempt by a speaker or writer or
artist to influence his audience in a particular fashion."" He argues that "the
refusal to treat pornography as speech is grounded in the assumption that the
prototypical pornographic item on closer analysis shares more of the character-
istics of sexual activity than of communicative process."'2 Schauer regards
pornography "as a purely physical, rather than a mental experience."' 3 This is
an experience of the listener. A great deal of Schauer's discussion concerns
the physical arousal of an audience. However, in some cases, such as with
D.H. Lawrence's banned novel, Lady Chatterley's Lover, First Amendment
protection is extended, according to Schauer, because "[tihe sexual stimu-
lus . . . is only a side effect."' 4
Schauer invokes the conduct/expression distinction to justify the prohibi-
tion of obscenity, claiming that because language can be used in non-commu-
nicative ways, not all that may seem to be speech actually is speech. He notes,
"[t]here are as many different meanings as there are different uses."' 5 Ulti-
mately, Schauer posits that sexually explicit expression is equivalent to con-
duct such as murder or rape and does not constitute a form of speech.'6 To
assume that obscenity is speech just because our ordinary conception of
speech may encompass it, Schauer argues, is to grant speech too broad a
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). An expression/conduct theory must be audience-focused because to
focus on the speaker would mean granting the status of protected expression to every action that is
intended by the speaker to be an expression. The expression/conduct distinction, by its very na-
ture, claims that some intended expressions are, in fact, not expressions, but conduct, and that
determination is made by looking not to the speaker's intentions, but to the audience.
11. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 921.
12. Id. at 922.
13. Id. at 923.
14. Id. at 925. Steven Gey correctly notes that this admission indicates the weakness of
Schauer's theory. See Gey, supra note 6, at 1594-95 n.141. Gey asks, "[clould it not be argued
that since its publication the book has made a much larger splash as a sexual stimulus than as a
piece of literature?" Id. This might argue for censorship. Gey is correct in pointing out this weak-
ness, but these are not the grounds upon which I will criticize Schauer's theory. Instead, I will
attack Schauer on the ground that he posits an incoherent philosophy of mind, focusing on the
listener instead of the speaker's intention to communicate.
15. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 908.
16. See id. at 903.
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definition. 7 The Supreme Court, in employing the expression/conduct distinc-
tion, appears to be making the same assumptions. 8
In fact, this expression/conduct distinction provides a convenient formula
for demarcating an area of protection for the First Amendment. Schauer de-
fines expression as activity that produces a "cognitive content" in the listen-
er. "'9 According to Schauer, it is this activity that must be protected.2" He
makes cognitive content, as opposed to conduct, the distinguishing feature of
protected expression. If it is speech, then it is something that stimulates cogni-
tive content in the listener rather than, say, a purely physical reaction. Schauer
is correct in noting that if one is going to use the expression/conduct distinc-
tion, one necessarily must assume the existence of this cognitive content for
protected speech. However, as I will show, the notion of cognitive content is
meaningless, and despite Schauer's claims to the contrary, is explicitly anti-
Wittgensteinian.2'
Cass Sunstein takes a position similar to Schauer's, arguing that "[tihe
term 'cognitive' has a philosophical meaning restricting it to the propositional
and distinguishing it from the emotive .... To react cognitively is to react
mentally."22 Although Sunstein claims that his view is not purely Cartesian,
he argues that for First Amendment jurisprudence it is necessary to maintain
the distinction between the cognitive and the non-cognitive." Like Schauer,
Sunstein uses an inner cognitive content to define what constitutes speech.
Obviously, not all action is speech. The trick for any theorist is to deter-
mine what constitutes speech without crossing the line leading to an incoherent
philosophy of mind. Sunstein complains that without a distinction between
speech and non-speech, it is impossible "to identify the distinctive characteris-
17. See id. Steven Gey criticizes Schauer:
This deft sleight of hand owes more to Humpty Dumpty than to Wittgenstein: the word
"speech" means just what Schauer chooses it to mean-neither more nor less. Schauer
does not challenge the notion of objective meaning, as did Wittgenstein, rather, Schauer
seeks to interpret the word "speech" in the context of the first amendment by replacing
one objective meaning-that of ordinary usage-with another--communication with
cognitive content.
Gey, supra note 6, at 1590. Gey's point is well taken and correct. However, the problem is more
complex than he realizes. The problem is not merely that Schauer replaces one definition with an-
other. Schauer, in fact, makes several mistakes that are common parts of any expression/conduct
theory.
18. As Schauer notes, "[i]mplicit in the Court's reasoning is the notion that hardcore pomog-
raphy is designed to produce a purely physical effect." Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note
7, at 922; see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1966) (making reference to
"erotically arousing," "titillation," and "sexual stimulation").
19. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 922.
20. Id. Schauer claims that this is the only way to make sense of the Supreme Court's ob-
scenity doctrine and exclusion of obscenity from protected speech. Id. Although Schauer is correct
that implicit in the expression/conduct assumption is the notion of a cognitive content in the lis-
tener, I will argue that any theory that espouses this kind of private inner object is incoherent.
21. Schauer attempts to use Wittgenstein's conception of "meaning as use" to support his
theory. Below, I will argue that Wittgenstein's concept of expression is very different from
Schauer's.
22. Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J.
420, 421.
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment and Cognition: A Response, 1989 DUKE L.
433.
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tics entitling 'speech,' and not other forms of human experience, to consti-
tutional protection.24
Schauer also states that "[if freedom of speech is in fact synonymous
with freedom of expression---encompassing communication as well as other
forms of self-expression-speech is virtually indistinguishable from other
action. '25 The problem that Schauer and Sunstein are wrestling with is that a
21great many actions may be self-expression, such as owning a Ferrari, yet
are not protected speech. Schauer and Sunstein are correct in observing that
freedom of expression is not co-extensive with freedom of action. However,
the distinction upon which they wish to pin the First Amendment is incoher-
ent.
As I will explain below, expression/conduct distinction theories assume
that with certain speech, a private inner object (the cognitive content) is
formed in the listener, and that with other kinds of speech, it is not formed.
The only protected speech, then, is the type that breeds private inner objects.
This is an inherently incoherent position, and a position that Wittgenstein
spent a good portion of his writings trying to refute.
II. STEPPING BACK TO PHILOSOPHY
Sunstein and Schauer claim that expressions are those things that at least
have the potential of successful transmission. That is, they cause "something"
to happen in the listener. Judicial opinions that rely on the expression/conduct
distinction implicitly make the same assumption. This something would seem
to be a private mental event in the mind of the listener.
Sunstein and Schauer's notion of language and communication (and the
notion implicit in case law that uses the conduct/expression distinction) is
similar to the notion Wittgenstein tries to combat. In the following passage,
the flawed theory of the mind that Wittgenstein describes is, ultimately,
Sunstein and Schauer's theory:
[W]e are so accustomed to communication through language, in con-
versation, that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication
lay in this: someone else grasps the sense of my words-which is
something mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he then
does something further with it as well, that is no part of the immedi-
ate purpose of language.27
Wittgenstein's point is that one would like to assume that something mental
goes on with communication-that when the communication is understood, the
listener takes it into his own mind. But this is a conceptual trap, one that
Schauer and Sunstein blithely fall into.28
24. Id. at 436.
25. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 912.
26. Id.
27. WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 363.
28. The Schauer and Sunstein view is close to C.L. Stevenson's notion that expression takes
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In order for expression and communication to take place, what counts is
the entire public context, not a private mental event in the listener.29 "Make
the following experiment: say 'It's cold in here' and mean 'It's warm in here'.
Can you do it?-And what are you doing as you do it? And is there only one
way of doing it?"3" The experiment shows the incoherence of a private def-
inition. One can say, "It's cold in here" when it is above 80 degrees Fahren-
heit and refer to the warmth, if society has defined "cold" as meaning over 80
degrees. However, one cannot say, "It's cold in here," and actually mean the
sentence, "It's warm in here." Such a statement is incoherent. A private inner
definition is meaningless and certainly does not qualify as the distinction be-
tween expression and conduct. What makes the expression, "It's cold in here,"
meaningful is the public context in which it is spoken, not some private inner
event (or "cognitive content") occurring in the hearer. The only criterion that
can determine what constitutes an expression is the public context in which it
is spoken.
Of course, as the Supreme Court has recognized, expressions are not just
linguistic." For example, a cry can be an expression: "Can I not say: a cry, a
laugh, are full of meaning? And that means, roughly: much can be gathered
from them." 2 Indeed, laughing and crying can be forms of communication,
just as the statement, "I am sad." There are times when our "words can be
wrung from us, like a cry,"3 the words being a mere replacement for the
crying.34
place where the speaker "must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude
(cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency, in the case of a speaker, to be produced by that attitude,
these tendencies being dependent on 'an elaborate process of conditioning which has attended the
sign's use in communication."' CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 57 (1944).
29. An audience-focused expression/conduct theory will generally make the mentalist as-
sumptions of Schauer and Sunstein. However, one might ask whether the determination of what is
"conduct" versus what is "expression" could be made using public criteria-without postulating
private inner mental events. The reason Schauer's cognitive content is a private mental event is
that once the theorist turns the focus away from the speaker's intention to the audience, the theo-
rist looks for something in the audience to limit the category of the speaker's expression. An
obvious thing to look for, as Schauer does, is a special kind of inner mental event in the audience
that takes place when the audience is perceiving First Amendment expression, but does not take
place when perceiving pornography. Schauer states: "[Tjhe use of pornography may be treated
conceptually as a purely physical rather than a mental experience." Schauer, Speech and Obsceni-
ty, supra note 7, at 923. Although he admits that the formulation is too simple in that nothing is
purely one or the other, Schauer states that with pornography, even if something mental is in-
volved, it has "none of the characteristics of the intellectual process constituting the core of the
constitutional definition of speech." Id. This intellectual process-the cognitive content-is some
inner event that occurs with some communication, but not others. What then is this internal "men-
tal element" that is missing when one reads pornography as opposed to protected fiction? I will
argue that there is no such internal mental event.
30. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 510.
31. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505, 514 (1969)
(upholding the right of high school students to wear black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam
war as a symbolic act within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
32. WIrTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 543.
33. Id. § 546.
34. Wittgenstein observes, "A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to
him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior."
Wittgenstein's interlocutor then asks, "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means cry-
ing?" Wittgenstein responds, "On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and
19951
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Words and non-verbal expressions communicate in a context, and a sole
mental event (or some cognitive content in the -listener) cannot determine an
expression's meaning or determine when an action is an expression. In another
example, Wittgenstein shows how a mental event like "hope" only makes
sense in the context of a public language. Looking at a purely isolated private
mental event is an incoherent exercise:
Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N.N. will come and
bring me some money, and suppose one minute of this state could be
isolated, cut out of its context; would what happened in it then not be
hope? Think, for example, of the words which you perhaps utter in
this space of time. They are no longer part of this language. And in
different surroundings the institution of money doesn't exist either. 5
In Wittgenstein's example, "hope" cannot simply be an inner mental event that
distinguishes the "hope" state from another mental state, but includes the
context, i.e., money, rooms, the fact that N.N. exists and may come. A private
mental event out of the public context is incoherent. Similarly, an expression
is shaped by the context of the speaker. In determining what constitutes ex-
pression, the entire array of publicly accessible facts and events must come
into play. Schauer and Sunstein seem to assume that when actual, cognitive
communication occurs, a private, distinguishable, internal mental event occurs.
This, for them, distinguishes certain kinds of pornography, which they claim
produce only a physical effect, from protected expression, which spurs a
private cognition experience in the listener.
Take the following example of a non-verbal expression: a woman wants
to go across town, walks to a street comer and raises her hand instinctively (to
hail a taxi). A cab driver might just as instinctively pull over in reaction to the
gesture. The outstretched arm waving for a taxi would be protected expression
but not because of anything going on in the mind of the cab driver. There may
be nothing! What constitutes the expression is the entire context of the action:
the fact that the woman decided to take a taxi; the fact that in our culture,
putting one's hand up as a taxi approaches signals to the driver that he should
stop; and the very fact that our society has taxi cabs. A complete explanation
of the expression in this case will include these factors, but there is no need to
posit a specific inner mechanism in the cab driver that only is triggered when
he is at the receiving end of a protected expression.
The raising of one's hand is taught by seeing others use the same signal
to hail a cab. We learn the technique of hailing cabs, and this technique is
what we call the "expression" of an intention (namely the intention to travel
by taxi). To propose that it signifies the presence of a cognitive event in the
receiver of the signal, as Schauer does, makes no sense if one recognizes that
expressions are simply the learning of a technique.
does not describe it." Id. § 244.
35. Id. § 584.
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In fact, many of our activities may be triggered by expressions to which
we respond "automatically" once we learn the technique. Some might want to
posit a cognitive mechanism even in these situations. However, this position is
problematic. In the case of an "automatic" response, the only kind of intellec-
tual internal mechanism possible is one that works very quickly. Once the
theorist invokes such fleeting cognitive mechanisms to distinguish protected
from unprotected expression, he or she is on very shaky ground. How many
nano-seconds of cognitive activity in an audience are sufficient to keep a
pornographer out of prison? Certainly no such inner mechanism should be the
basis for deciding what constitutes protected expression in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Moreover, one may wonder whether such a fleeting inner mech-
anism even exists.
Once we rid ourselves of the notion that something mental must occur in
the hearer for there to be protected expression, we still face the dilemma of
determining what types of actions are protected by the First Amendment.
The Schauer/Sunstein theories are flawed because it is incoherent to look
in the audience's mind for something to happen when the audience perceives
First Amendment expression. This dilemma can be expressed as follows:
(1) There is no mental inner object to distinguish conduct from ex-
pression.
(2) All "expression" can be characterized as conduct. For
Wittgenstein, expression is conduct.
(3) But for legal purposes, not all conduct is protected speech.
The error lies in the misplaced focus on listeners rather than speakers. The
Supreme Court, and many theorists, have been looking at the wrong end of the
problem. Instead of looking to the reaction of the listener-that is, whether it
is purely physical or cognitive-why not examine the speaker's intention to
determine what kind of expression is protected?
III. GRICE'S INTENTIONS
Let us begin with Paul Grice's definition of what constitutes expression:
A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must
also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended. But these
intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to
play its part in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something
will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A's intentions.36
This definition will allow one to distinguish some cases of expression
from mere action. For example, "I have a very avaricious man in my room,
and I want him to go; so I throw a pound note out of the window."37 In this
36. H.P. Grice, Meaning, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 436, 441 (Jay F.
Rosenberg & Charles Travis eds., 1971).
37. Id.
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case, "I did not intend his recognition of my purpose to be in any way effec-
tive in getting him to go,""5 and there was no expression.
Grice points out, however, that the speaker's intention need not be openly
stated or even expressible to be present:
Explicitly formulated linguistic (or quasi-linguistic) intentions are no
doubt comparatively rare. In their absence we would seem to rely on
very much the same kinds of criteria as we do in the case of
nonlinguistic intentions where there is a general usage. An utterer is
held to intend to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally
intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting
that a particular use diverges from the general usage ... 9
Grice correctly notes that often when one asks about a speaker's intention in
expressing something, "the answer is not based on what he remembers but is
more like a decision, a decision about how what he said is to be taken."' We
do not now want to make the mistake of assuming an inner mental act in the
speaker.'
Therefore, from Grice, we can identify the following attributes of expres-
sion:
(1) In communicating, the speaker must be attempting (intending) to
communicate something to the hearer.'2
(2) The speaker is trying to make the hearer recognize that intention.
(3) The communication is successful when the hearer recognizes that
intention.43
Grice's theory has been correctly criticized as a theory of meaning for reasons
I will explain below. We are not concerned, however, with developing a theo-
ry of meaning, but a workable rule for First Amendment jurisprudence. Fortu-
nately, the very ways in which Grice fails to account for certain elements in a
theory of meaning make his theory suitable for a theory of First Amendment
expression. Grice fails to account for just the sort of things in meaning that the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 443.
40. Id. at 444. John Searle summarizes Grice's theory: "[tio say that a speaker S meant
something by X is to say that S intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in a hearer H
by means of the recognition of the intention." JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 43 (1970) (citing
H.P. Grice, Meaning, 1957 PHIL. REV. 377, 377-88, reprinted in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE 436 (Jay F. Rosenberg & Charles Travis eds., 1971)).
41. See infra text accompanying note 50.
42. Without this criterion, all action would be speech. For the First Amendment to have any
teeth, there must be some subcategory of communication that is protected. See Schauer, Speech
and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 912-13.
43. Grice states, with respect to what I label the third part, that "the intended effect must be
something which in some sense is within the control of the audience, or that in some sense of
'reason' the recognition of the intention behind x is for the audience a reason and not merely a
cause." Grice, supra note 36, at 442. This begins to sound like the theory that requires expression
to cognitively move its audience. Below, however, I reject this third part of Grice's thesis as prob-
lematic and unnecessary for a theory of what constitutes expression-although it might be neces-
sary for a theory of meaning, which is Grice's concern but not mine.
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Supreme Court has stated should not matter in a theory of First Amendment
"expression."
John Searle criticizes Grice's account of meaning because it "does not
show the connection between one's meaning something by what one says, and
what that which one says actually means in the language."" Basically, Searle
objects to the fact that Grice's theory fails as a theory of meaning. There are
times when we might, in saying one thing, mean something else:
Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War and
that I am captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to
get these troops to believe that I am a German soldier in order to get
them to release me. [Suppose I don't know enough German or Italian
to do that] ... Let us suppose I know only one line of German which
I remember from a poem I had to memorize in a high school German
course. Therefore, I, a captured American, address my Italian captors
with the following sentence: Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen
bliihen?"
By Grice's definition, because the speaker in the example intends to make the
soldier believe he is German, the meaning of the German sentence would have
to be, "I am a German soldier."' This is clearly wrong as a theory of mean-
ing. To understand how meaning works in this example, you need more con-
text. "Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes
a matter of convention. One might say that on Grice's account it would seem
that any sentence can be uttered with any meaning whatever, given that the
circumstances make possible the appropriate intentions."47
Grice's definition may, however, be a good theory of what counts as a
meaningful expression, even if it is not a good theory of meaning. Even in
Searle's absurd hypothetical, there is an intentional expression attempted to be
communicated.
Searle also complains that in his hypothetical, Grice's analysis fails from
the hearer's perspective. In other words, it does not achieve what I labeled
proposition (3) above. We need not be concerned with this because in an
analysis of First Amendment expression, we can ignore (3). What constitutes
successful communication is irrelevant for determining what constitutes ex-
pression. First Amendment protection should cover speech, whether or not it is
successfully communicated. A meeting of nuclear physicists may, to me,
sound like mere babbling; however, the expressions at such a meeting would
have First Amendment protection. What matters is that the communication
have some public meaning whereby the expression could potentially be suc-
cessful, even if a particular audience could not understand its meaning.
Still, we must modify the success criterion to prevent real babble expres-
sions from counting as expressions:
44. See SEARLE, supra note 40, at 43-48.
45. Id. at 44.
46. See id. at 45.
47. Id.
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(3)(a) The audience must potentially be able to recognize the com-
municated intention.
With criterion (3)(a) in place, our theory of expression can now accommodate
the role of public meaning.' Any speech that does not fit into our public lan-
guage game is not an expression. Protection for such babble is unnecessary.
Criterion (3)(a) ensures that purely private utterances are not taken to be
expressions.'
Grice's theory may be deficient as a theory of meaning, but it is an ade-
quate theory of expression because it makes a pivotal distinction: it places the
focus on the speaker's perspective. It is when a speaker intends or attempts to
put meaning into an expression, whether verbal or not, that the expression
should be protected.
If the speaker's intention is the crux of what constitutes protected expres-
sion, then we must be careful in defining the term "intention." As indicated
above,5" intention is a very complex philosophical issue. However, by shifting
the emphasis away from the listener to the speaker, I do not intend to transfer
the "inner cognitive content" to the speaker and simply label it intention.
Clearly, in either case the conception of a cognitive content is incoherent.
For a theory of expression, I believe it is necessary to add a (1)(a) to the
above three criteria in order to flesh out what is meant by intention:
(1)(a) When the speaker intends to communicate something, that
intention is determined by the public context of the speaker
(as opposed to determining intention by some inner event in
the speaker).5'
What allows the audience to potentially grasp the speaker's intention is the
fact that it must be an intention to communicate a public meaning (as laid out
in (3)(a)). An intention is, generally, a disposition to action, a readiness to do
or to try to do things that will achieve an intended state of affairs. In this case,
the intention is to communicate something. But in order for the speaker to
have an intention, it must be expressible in a public language. Therefore, it is
48. The Supreme Court has recognized this criterion. In deciding whether particular conduct
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, the Court
examines whether "[an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)
(attaching a peace sign to a flag held to demonstrate requisite intent)).
49. While ultimately, one may not care whether babble receives First Amendment protection,
clearly what is being protected is expression, not meaningless babble.
50. See supra text accompanying note 41.
51. See discussion, supra note 29, on why theories that espouse the expression/conduct dis-
tinction will generally make the mentalist assumptions that are not necessary when looking to
speaker's intentions. Again, the speaker's intentions will involve, very broadly, the entire context.
With the expression/conduct distinction, one looks to the mind of the audience in an attempt to
find something mentally different in the case of watching pornography from the case of watching
the movie STAR WARS (Twentieth Century-Fox, 1977). Looking at the context involved in a
speaker's intention broadens the category of expression-something the expression/conduct theo-
rist explicitly does not want to do.
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the public aspect of the intention and of the language with which the intention
is expressed that constitutes the criteria for the intention.
When discussing the mental event of shame, Wittgenstein notes, "'I am
not ashamed of what I did then, but of the intention which I had.'-And did-
n't the intention lie also in what I did? What justifies the shame? The whole
history of the incident."52 Wittgenstein's point is that what constitutes the
criteria for determining the intention is the whole incident, not some
identifiable mental event.
For the speaker to have an intention, we need not posit some mental event
occurring either in the listener or in the speaker himself. The example of hail-
ing a cab is apt: if someone sees a cab go by and, without thinking, raises her
hand (because she wants a cab), it makes no sense to call this an inner inten-
tion with cognitive content. The intention in that action is contained in the
entire public context of that action. As stated above, this includes the fact that
the agent decided to take a cab; the fact that in our culture, putting one's hand
up as a cab passes by signals to the driver that he has a customer; and the
very fact that our society has taxi cabs, uses money, has streets, etc. A com-
plete expression of the agent's intention in this case will include these factors,
but no specific inner cognition is lodged within the cab driver's mind that
distinguishes an intentional mental event from other non-intentional mental
events. The disposition to attempt to communicate is determined by the entire
context. This, then, is protected communication because:
(1) The communicator is attempting (intending) to communicate
to the passing cab driver that she needs a ride.
(1)(a) This intention to communicate is composed of the entire
context of the situation (this signal is used to get cabs; our
society has cabs, etc.).
(2) The communicator is attempting to convey her intention to
the hearer.
(3) The communication would be successful if a cab driver
recognized the intention.
(3)(a) The hearers are potentially able to understand this signal (the
signal is in a public language and is accepted as communica-
tion signifying a desire for a ride).
These criteria for determining what expression is protected do have some
limits. Pornography and obscenity, however, would both appear to be protect-
ed, for in both:
(1) The communicator is attempting (intending) to communicate
to the reader the idea of sexuality, albeit graphically.
(1)(a) This intention to communicate is composed of the entire
context of the situation (what constitutes sexuality in our
society; what are considered taboos; the fact that our society
has magazines, etc.).
52. WI'rrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 644.
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(2) The communicator is attempting to convey that intention to
the reader.
(3) The communication would be successful if the reader of the
pornography recognized that intention (it would be unsuc-
cessful to a reader who would simply take offense or be
disgusted).
(3)(a) Even if a specific reader might be disgusted, there are read-
ers potentially able to understand the communication.
Although some may want to regulate obscenity for reasons of content,53 or
find justifiable reasons for regulating pornography even under the strict scruti-
ny standard, it would fall under the basic criterion for protection. However, the
above outlined criteria based solely on the intention of the speaker does have
its limits. It assumes that the First Amendment only protects speech where
there is an intention to communicate that intention. Without that intention,
then, there is no expression. Sleeping outdoors while on holiday would not be
expression, unless in the particular context there is an. attempt to communicate
something by that action, such as calling attention to the plight of the home-
less.54 Without this intention, there is no expression and no communication.
Limitations deriving from content, however, such as pornography or obscenity,
would have to be struck down as unconstitutional unless they passed strict
scrutiny.
It is now necessary to test this new theory to determine whether it defines
expression too broadly. After all, if the necessary criterion for an "intention to
communicate" is not limited to some mental event in the listener, but rather,
involves the broad context of the speaker, more actions will be "intentional"
communications. Using a private mental event to distinguish protected expres-
sion from unprotected action seems easy (albeit incoherent), but it poses a
danger that any alternative will make the definition of "expression" too all-
encompassing.
IV. THE LIMITS ON PROTECTED EXPRESSION
The harsh reality of a philosophically coherent theory of expression which
looks at the speaker's intention to communicate is that it will define intention
rather broadly. Although certain actions will not be expressive ones, such as
those without the requisite speaker's intention, the vast majority of actions will
53. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973).
54. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In this case,
involving protestors sleeping in Lafayette Park (across from the White House) in order to call
attention to the plight of the homeless, the Supreme Court upheld National Park Service regula-
tions that forbade all sleeping in the park. Id. at 289, 298. The court in Clark, by failing to look to
the speaker's intention, judged the activity to be pure conduct of the sort that can be regulated by
neutral regulations. In my scheme, this would be considered protected expression because, clearly,
the purpose of sleeping in the park was to protest. Compare this to camping out in a national park
while on holiday. This activity contains no expressive intention on the camper's part and would
not be protected expression.
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qualify as expression. This is because much of what we do has an intentional
element of communication. Thus, limits on freedom of expression will have to
come from concepts outside the definition of expression. Indeed, there are
limiting principles that may override the right to free speech. The difficult task
will be determining when they come into effect.
Although some civil libertarians would like the speech right to be abso-
lute, there are no absolutes. As Justice Holmes noted:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would
justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitution-
ally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a
clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain
substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to
prevent."
Justice Brandeis observed that "the rights of free speech and assembly are
fundamental, [but] they are not in their nature absolute."56
The attempt to make the right to free speech, or any right, absolute, will
necessarily lead to an absurd conclusion. For example, a political assassination
would have to be categorized as a form of communication, just like a political
speech. However, the sanction against criminal acts such as murder outweighs
any right to free speech. The key to curbing such activity is not to strip it of
the status of expression, but to admit that other principles may impose limits
on free expression. 7
Justice Black, in his desire to be an absolutist, was forced to fall back
onto the conduct/expression distinction: "I do not believe, for example, that it
would invalidate laws resting upon the present that where speech is an integral
part of unlawful conduct that is going on at the time, the speech can be used
to illustrate, emphasize and establish the unlawful conduct."58
The problem with an absolutist theory is that it relies on the con-
duct/expression distinction because expressions will be limited by those actions
that are pure conduct (or "unlawful conduct"). Certainly, we need limiting
principles, but as I have shown, the conduct/expression distinction is inade-
quate for the task. Because it falsely implies that all expression is to be pro-
tected and is immune from regulation, it has to impose some artificial distinc-
tion to justify exclusion of non-protected expression; namely, to relabel unde-
sirable expression "conduct."
The proper response to any absolutist like Justice Black is to assert that
freedom of speech is a fundamental right, but concede that all rights must be
balanced against others' liberty interests. Although Black insisted that it should
be a complete and unconditional right for an American to express his views to
his neighbors, he was mistaken. No right can ever be absolute. Expression
cannot be immune from all regulation. What drives some theorists and some
55. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
57. The determination of when other rights override the right to freedom of expression is
well beyond the purview of this article.
58. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 64 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court Justices to make the conduct/expression distinction is the false
belief that expression is immune from regulation. Once one abandons this sim-
plistic belief, broadening the conception of expression becomes less problemat-
ic. You cannot, for example, express your views to your neighbor with a 120
decibel bullhorn at 2:00 A.M. There are always limits. The issue is not an
absolute right-for-free-speech approach versus a balancing approach. While
Justice Black was using a form of balancing, he was simply using the philo-
sophically incoherent notion of "conduct" to balance against "expression."59
For those theorists who use the expression/conduct distinction to deny
protection to pornography, the disconcerting reality is that there is no philo-
sophical distinction between pornography and any other kind of speech. What-
ever distinctions exist between it and other speech has nothing to do with its
being a form of communication. While other aspects of pornography may
require regulation, even under strict scrutiny, one cannot make any fundamen-
tal or philosophical distinction between different kinds of human expression.'
V. FREE SPEECH AS SELF-EXPRESSION:
THE CONSEQUENCE OF A SPEAKER-ORIENTED THEORY
I have been assuming throughout this article that if something counts as
expression, once we determine what that is, then it should be protected by the
First Amendment. Once we see that the expression/conduct distinction fails as
outlined in some Supreme Court decisions and by some theorists, it is neces-
sary to see why there is any value in allowing all expression, broadly defined,
the protection of the First Amendment.
Clearly in a First Amendment analysis, we must look to whether the
speaker deserves constitutional protection. This can be derived from the ana-
lytic deduction of what constitutes expression as described above. However,
this also leads to the more esoteric question of why expression should be pro-
tected at all.
Ronald Dworkin points out that there are two kinds of justification for
free speech: an instrumental justification, where free speech is important "not
because people have any intrinsic moral right to say what they wish, but be-
cause allowing them to do so will produce good effects for the rest of us;"6
and a constitutive justification, which "supposes that freedom of speech is
valuable, not just in virtue of the consequences it has, but because it is an
essential and 'constitutive' feature of a just political society that government
59. Robert McKay suggests that the most important notion is that of the "preferred position"
expressed by Justice Black, even if Black's absolutist position is unsatisfactory. Robert B. McKay,
The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1182-85, 1195 (1959).
60. Of course commercial speech may lead to a difficult problem. While this analysis shows
the incoherence of positing a mental event in either the listener or the speaker, it will be difficult
to determine what constitutes an intention on the part of a commercial enterprise. This investiga-
tion is beyond the scope of this article.
61. Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BooKs 55, 56 (June
11, 1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Battles].
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treat all its adult members, except those who are incompetent, as responsible
moral agents."62
The constitutive justification asserts that
morally responsible people insist on making up their own minds
about what is good or bad in life or in politics .... Government in-
sults its citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it de-
crees that they cannot be trusted to hear opinions that might persuade
them to dangerous or offensive convictions. We retain our dignity, as
individuals, only by insisting that no one-no official and no majori-
ty-has the right to withhold opinion from us on the ground that we
are not fit to hear and consider it.63
The expression/conduct distinction hinges on the assumption that some kinds
of communications are "dangerous and offensive." Theorists who claim that
pornography and other "conduct" (i.e., expression that does not produce a
cognitive content in the listener) are not expression have the instrumental goal
of keeping this material away from the populace.
Dworkin basically proposes to place in opposition a Kantian and a utili-
tarian vision of the First Amendment. In the utilitarian form, free speech is
used for an ultimate end, to create a better society of one type or another. The
Kantian vision acknowledges and respects the freedom of the speaker, not the
protection of the listener.
Dworkin's view is similar to that of Charles Fried, who has written,
[f]reedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian
right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal
sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest
liberty compatible with the like liberties of all others. Autonomy is
the foundation of all basic liberties, including liberty of expression.' 4
Another way to view this dichotomy is to see the instrumentalist theory as one
that concentrates too much on the listener. The audience of an expression is
the society, those other than the speaker. It is they whom the instrumentalist
view protects. When one incoherently holds that the philosophical notion of
expression focuses on the mental events of the audience, one is tending toward
the instrumentalist view, a view that looks to the good of the audience. Once
expression is viewed as a concept bound in the speaker, one can come to
accept the Kantian view.
VI. SELF-EXPRESSION IN SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The concept of the First Amendment protecting the speaker's right to self-
expression can also be found in some Supreme Court jurisprudence. Generally,
62. Id.
63. Id. at 56-57.
64. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MOR-
ALS (Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959 (1785)); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSI-
CAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965 (1797))).
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however, the Supreme Court tends to look at the listener. In the nude dancing
cases, for example, the Court appears to be concerned not with what the danc-
er may be trying to express, but instead with whether the listener's response is
merely that of a physical manifestation.65 This is the same mistake that
Schauer and Sunstein make. Both look for something to happen in the listener,
some cognitive machine that turns when "real" communication takes place.
This is looking at the wrong end of the puzzle.
Justice White, however, in First National Bank v. Bellotti,66 noted that
speaker focused self-expression should be the grounding for the First Amend-
ment. In his dissent he stated:
Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the
First Amendment, [is] the use of communication as a means of self-
expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment .... It is clear that the
communications of profitmaking corporations are not "an integral part
of the development of ideas, of mental exploration, and of the affir-
mation of self." They do not represent a manifestation of individual'
freedom or choice.67
In assessing how corporate speech should be protected, Justice White discusses
whether and when a profit-making corporation furthers "the self-expression or
self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as
individuals would. '6' For Justice White, the object of First Amendment guar-
antees is to protect the self-expression of the communicator. Although Justice
White admits that the right to receive information is also a goal, Justice Harlan
speaks of an approach to the First Amendment freedom of expression clause
that "comport[s] with the premise of individual dignity."'
Justice White's grounding principle of self-expression is consistent with
the earlier emphasis in this article on speakers' intentions. When the emphasis
of a First Amendment theory is on the audience, it looks for something special
to happen within the listener. Such a theory of First Amendment predictions of
expression falsely assumes that somehow it is possible to locate some private
attribute in listeners. A theory of self-expression is absolutely consistent with
the rejection of the expression/conduct distinction.
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, ° Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that "[tihis Court has recognized that natural persons
enjoy negative free speech fights because of their interest in self-expression;
an individual's right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others is a
component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in freedom
65. See discussion supra note 2.
66. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
67. First National, 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting T. EMERSON, TO-
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966)); see also Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980) (noting that "[f]reedom of speech also
protects the individual's interest in self-expression").
68. First National, 435 U.S. at 806 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
70. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
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of conscience."7 The implication is that the First Amendment is meant to
protect "the individual freedom of conscience."7 Chief Justice Rehnquist rec-
ognizes that there is a strong First Amendment interest in "freedom of thought
and expression"'3 as being an expression of individual conscience, whether it
be to speak or not to speak.74
Dissenting in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.," Jus-
tice Brennan stressed both the protection of the speaker and the protection of
the audience. Recognizing the importance of the role of the speaker, he stated
that "[t]he free speech guarantee gives each citizen an equal right to self-ex-
pression and to participation in self-government."76 Yet, Brennan also stated
that this guarantee protects the rights of listeners to "the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."77
As discussed above, the protection of individuals' self-expression makes
philosophical sense. What is protected is not something for which we must go
digging in the mind of the listener. On the contrary, we should look to the
outward manifestation of the speaker, the intention of the expression itself. By
doing so, we acknowledge and respect all humans and all aspects of commu-
nication that humans desire to express, no matter how some other sections of
the population may view it. In the nude dancing cases, there is no lack of a
private inner object. A person's response to a stimulating speech or his re-
sponse to a nude dance are not categorically different. Both are in some sense
intellectual, and in some sense emotional. The expression should be protected
unless and until some other overriding interest trumps that right.78
CONCLUSION
In the end, there is nothing inherently different about flag burning, ob-
scenity, pornography, nude dancing and other protected expression, such as
political speech or erotic art. The Supreme Court was treading a misguided
path when it embraced the theory that "[certain] utterances comprise no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas ' 79 and are not expressions (and there-
71. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 33.
73. Id. at 32 (quoting Harper and Row Publisher, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 524,
559 (1985)).
74. Of course there are cases in which the Supreme Court stresses the utilitarian justification
for the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). In Bates,
the Court stated that the goal of the First Amendment is to enlighten public decision-making. This
is an example of the utilitarian justification of the First Amendment. Id.; see also supra note 8.
75. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
76. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 783 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 459-63 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring)).
77. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 783 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
78. Again, this determination is beyond this article. However, I would note that the right to
freedom of expression should be considered a primary right that can rarely be overridden.
79. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
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fore not protected). If the Supreme Court wants to regulate certain categories
of "idealess utterances" ''1 or "conduct," it must do so by relying on overriding
principles that supersede the right of free speech."' To call them non-expres-
sion and mere physical conduct is at best incoherent and at worst, cynically
disingenuous.
80. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 920.
81. It is worth noting, as Steven Gey does, that Schauer believes pornography may be sup-
pressed because it lacks "a certain kind of value." Gey, supra note 6, at 1595 (quoting Schauer,
Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 927 (emphasis omitted)). Therefore, in Schauer's theory,
pornography should not only be denied First Amendment protection because it is not expression,
but there also lurks the utilitarian aim of not granting pornography such protection because it
promotes the wrong kind of social value.
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